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In April of 2000, the Radiocommunications Agency of the United Kingdom completed its first spectrum auction, raising
£22.5 billion for five third-generation (3G) mobile wireless licenses. This paper assesses how well the UK 3G spectrum auction
did in achieving the Government's objectives. 
I have been a major participant in spectrum auctions, since December 1993 when the United States was planning for its first
spectrum auction. My involvement has been in all aspects of the auctions: advising governments on auction design, advising
bidders on auction strategy, and conducting theoretical and empirical research. Since 1993, I have written over one-dozen
research papers on spectrum auctions, which have been published in leading economic journals. I have advised several
governments on spectrum auction design, including the United States, Canada, and Australia. I have also advised twenty bidders
in spectrum auctions around the world. I have advised a bidder in nearly all of the 3G auctions conducted so far. In the
UK auction, I advised One 2 One, which provided a glimpse of the UK auction process from design through execution. 
Auctions have become the preferred method of assigning scarce spectrum to companies. The primary advantage of an auction is
its tendency to assign the spectrum to those best able to use it. This is accomplished by competition among license applicants.
Those companies with the highest value for the spectrum likely are willing to bid higher than the others, and hence tend to win
the licenses. There are several subtleties that limit the efficiency of spectrum auctions. Still a well-designed auction is apt to be
highly efficient. A second important advantage of auctions is that the competition is not wasteful. The competition leads to
auction revenues, which can be used to offset distortionary taxation. Finally, an auction is a transparent means of assigning
licenses. All parties can see who won the auction and why.
Since the mid-1990s, the United States has relied on auctions to award spectrum. Thus far, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) has conducted thirty-four auctions. The auctions have performed well in assigning the scarce spectrum to its
best use. Certainly, there have been some bumps along the road, but overall the auction program has been highly successful. 
Many other countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and India have also used auctions in the last five
years. Many of these countries learned from the FCC's experience with spectrum auctions in deciding on a design of their own.
The approaches taken have varied from country to country, and within a country from auction to auction. The most common
approach is the simultaneous ascending auction, adopted by the FCC. Even within this broad format, there have been subtle
differences that can play an important role in the auction's success.
Although the United Kingdom did not begin auctioning spectrum until 2000, it began with a bang. Its very first auction broke
into the record books as the world's largest auction ever.

























The Government's overall aim for the auction was "to secure,
for the long term benefit of United Kingdom customers and
the national economy, the timely and economically
advantageous development and sustained provision of third-
generation services in the United Kingdom." Subject to this,
the Government's objectives were to: 
1 Utilize the available spectrum with optimum efficiency;
2 Promote effective and sustainable competition for the
provision of third-generation services; and
3 Subject to the overall objectives, design an auction that
is best judged to realize the full economic value to
customers, industry and the taxpayer of the spectrum.
My remarks will assess how successful the auction was in
achieving the objectives above. First let me define how I
interpret the three objectives above. As shorthand, I will refer
to these objectives as efficiency, competition, and revenues.
Efficiency. I define efficiency as putting the spectrum in its
highest-valued use. There are two steps in spectrum
utilization: allocation and assignment. The allocation defines
the licenses (the frequency band, the geographic area, the
duration, and the restrictions on use). The assignment of the
licenses is then determined by auction. I will address how
both the allocation and auction design decisions likely
affected efficiency.
My definition of efficiency is the broad notion of economic
efficiency, rather than a narrow definition of technical
efficiency. Technical efficiency focuses on providing services at
minimal cost. From an engineering sense, this is best
accomplished by a single network that avoids any duplication.
However, from a practical viewpoint, competition can
enhance the economic value of the spectrum by fostering
innovation and better services. Thus, I do not view efficiency as
directly in conflict with competition. A smaller competitor may
well value its first 10 MHz of spectrum at more than the value
of the last 10 MHz of spectrum won by a dominant incumbent.
If so, efficiency dictates that the incremental 10 MHz of
spectrum should go to the small competitor, despite any
network duplication.
Efficiency should also take into account things like flexible
use, resale, leasing, roaming, all of which can serve to
promote efficient use. However, these topics are beyond the
scope of this paper.
Competition. Competition refers to the market structure that
results from the license assignment. The allocation and
auction design play a critical role in determining this market
structure. More competitive market structures are preferred,
since they lead to greater innovation, better services, and
lower prices. Competition is an essential goal for a
government seeking to maximize social welfare. Generally,
more competitors means more competition. However,
because the provision of 3G services requires enormous fixed
costs, there is a limit to how many competitors the market
can sustain. Four strong competitors with more bandwidth
may yield greater competition than six competitors with less
bandwidth, especially if number five and six are weak.
Revenues. I interpret the Government's stated goal as a desire
to maximize total surplus of the auction, taking into account
its impact on consumers, industry, and the taxpayer. This goal
is quite different from maximizing revenues. For example,
one auction may attain higher revenues than another, but be
inferior with respect to the government's objective if the
revenue benefit to the taxpayer is more than offset by losses
to industry and consumers. The goal as stated is an efficiency
goal, rather than a revenue maximizing goal: create as much
value as possible from the 3G auction for all participants in
the economy. Raising revenues does have a potential
efficiency gain, since auction revenues can be used to offset
distortionary taxation. In the United States, economists have
estimated the deadweight loss associated with taxation at
about 33% (it costs the economy $1.33 to raise $1 in taxes).
To the extent that auction revenues are not distortionary, then
raising revenues has an efficiency gain. This is likely the case.
Since the license fee is a sunk cost, it should have little
impact on the 3G services or prices that are ultimately
observed in the market.
For simplicity, I will define the revenue goal as maximizing
revenues. However, this is not the goal as stated by the
government in goal 3 above, nor do I believe that it is a
desirable goal in itself. Rather revenue is a useful way to
contrast alternative design choices. Efficiency and
competition should be the ultimate objectives.
The UK auction format
The Government used a simultaneous ascending auction to
auction five 3G licenses, A-E. The bandwidth for each license
is as follows: 
License A was set aside for a new entrant. Only potential new
entrants could bid on this license. All bidders could bid on
any of the remaining licenses (B to E). Licenses have a twenty
year duration.
Bandwidth in MHz for each License
ABCD E
Paired 2 x 15 2 x 15 2 x 10 2 x 10 2 x 10
spectrum
Unpaired 5 0 5 5 5
spectrum
















The simultaneous ascending auction used in the UK is a
variation on the design used in the US. The UK design takes
advantage of the especially simple license structure, namely
the fact that each bidder can win at most one license. In
contrast, most of the US auctions have had many regions and
many licenses within each region, which greatly complicates
bidding strategy. Here I provide only a brief description of 
the rules.
The auction worked as follows. All five licenses were up for
auction at one time. The auction proceeded in a sequence of
rounds. In each round, bidders that were not the current price
bidder on a license could place a bid on a license, raising the
price on that license by at least the minimum bid increment.
At the end of the round, all bids and bidders were identified,
together with the price bid (highest bid) and bidder for each
license and the minimum bid in the next round. The auction
continued until no bidder was willing to bid higher on any of
the licenses. This format is a natural extension of the familiar
English auction when selling multiple items with
interdependent values.
There were several important details.
Associated bidders. The auction could have involved two
phases. The first phase would have resolved conflicts among
associated bidders, bidders that have an ownership interest in
each other. In phase one, bidding would have occurred
sequentially on a MHz basis until no associations remained.
Then the group of now unassociated bidders would compete
in phase two (the simultaneous ascending auction). This
approach guaranteed that the five winners of the auction
were unassociated. Indeed, all associations were resolved
before phase one, so the auction actually began in 
phase two.
Spectrum cap. A company (or associated companies) could
win at most one license. This guaranteed that there would be
five distinct competitors for the provision of 3G services.
Deposits. Bidders were required to make an initial deposit of
£50 million to enter the bidding. The deposit increased by
£50 million when the bid exceeds £400 million. The deposit
was intended to guarantee performance by winning bidders
at the end of the auction. The deposit was fully refunded to
losing bidders.
Payment. Winning bidders could either pay in full at the end
of the auction, or pay in installments. However, the
installment payment terms were sufficiently unattractive that
all winners choose to pay in full.
Minimum opening bids. The minimum opening bids were:
Minimum bid increments. To assure that the auction
concluded in a reasonable amount of time, new bids had to
exceed the price bid by at least the minimum bid increment.
The increment was set as a percentage of the prior price bid.
Bid increments fell as the number of bidders decreased.
Activity rule. A bidder had to be active in every round of
bidding. A bidder was active in a round if: (1) it was the
current price bidder, (2) it placed a bid on a license, or (3) it
used a waiver. Bidders were given three waivers. This rule
guaranteed that the auction progressed with each round of
bidding. It also facilitated price discovery. The waivers
allowed bidders to briefly pause their bidding. If a longer
pause in the bidding was required, the bidder could call
recess, which would stop all bidding for the rest of the day,
and possibly the next day. Each bidder could call up to two
recess days once the number of bidders had reduced to eight.
A bidder that was the current price bidder was not allowed to
bid on another license or raise its current price bid.
Number of rounds per day. A final means of controlling the
pace of the auction was the number of rounds per day. The
Government posted a schedule for the next day. The bidding
began with few rounds per day, but increased as bidders
became comfortable with the process.
Stopping rule. The auction ends if a single round passes in
which no new bids or waivers are submitted on any license.
Bid information. The auction was fully transparent. Each
bidder was fully informed about the identities of the bidders.
Price bids and price bidders were posted after each round. In
addition, all bids and bidder identities were displayed at the
conclusion of each round, together with information on the
use of waivers or recesses. 
Bid withdrawal. Bids could not be withdrawn. A bid was an
irrevocable commitment. This assured that the bids were
serious.
Minimum Opening Bids (million £)
ABCD E


























The UK 3G auction began on 6 March 2000 and finished on
27 April 2000, after 150 rounds and seven weeks of bidding.
Thirteen bidders competed for the five licenses. All conflicts
with associated bidders were resolved before qualification,
so the bidding began in phase 2. The auction was the largest
auction in history, raising £22.5 billion in revenues. This
amount exceeded the total revenues of all US spectrum
auctions conducted over the six years prior, which is
remarkable given that the US is 4.5 times the size of the UK.
The total amounts to 650 euros per person or 1100 euros per
current subscriber.
The final winners and prices paid were:
The prices exceeded the expectations of everyone:
government, industry, bidders, and taxpayers. There is no
question that the auction was successful in generating
revenues.
Most of the bidders pursued a strategy of bidding on the
license that represented the best value. Bidders thus switched
from license to license as the prices changed. The exceptions
were Vodafone and Orange, both of which staked out
particular markets. Vodafone bid exclusively on the B license,
the only large license available to incumbents. Vodafone often
would use jump bids (bids above the minimum bid) to express
its resolve in winning the B license. Even Vodafone's final bid
was a jump bid. Orange staked out the E license, bidding
exclusively on E, once the B license became too expensive. 
The pricing dynamics were predictable, although certainly
not the absolute level of prices. The prediction comes from
understanding the existing market structure and how the
auction works. First, there were four incumbents: Vodafone,
BT, Orange, and One2One. Incumbents have much higher
values than potential entrants. For an incumbent, the value of
a license is the value of future 3G services plus the value of
2G revenues lost if it fails to secure a license. It is reasonable
to suppose that consumers would prefer to get 2G service
from an operator that has plans for 3G service. For an entrant,
the value of a license is the value of future 3G services minus
the cost of building a network. An incumbent's existing
infrastructure reduces its 3G buildout cost. Finally, the more
2G customers an operator has, the easier it is to attract 3G
customers. Thus, it is easy to predict that the four incumbents
would each win a license, leaving the A license to the
strongest new entrant. The second large license would go to
either Vodafone or BT. These companies financially were the
strongest and likely had the highest value for 3G services as
a result of their much larger market shares compared with the
younger incumbents. The two uncertainties were: (1) who
was the strongest potential entrant, and (2) was Vodafone
stronger than BT.
All the prices were effectively determined by two bidders: (1)
NTL, the strongest among the eight unsuccessful new
entrants, and (2) BT, the strongest among the three
incumbents that failed to win a large license. NTL effectively
set the price for C, D, E at just over £4 billion, when it
dropped out of the auction in round 148. TIW's price for the
A license was also set by NTL's arbitrage between the large A
license and the smaller C, D, and E licenses. The bidding of
NTL and the other new entrants indicated that the new
entrants did not value the extra 5 MHz of paired spectrum
very much. In contrast the two largest incumbents valued the
extra 5 MHz a great deal. BT ultimately set the price for the
B license when it placed its final bid on B in round 142.
Vodafone's price per MHz was roughly equal to the prices
paid for the small incumbent licenses (C, D, and E).
Contrast with other auction outcomes
Revenues in the UK 3G auction were the highest on a per
person basis than any broadband spectrum auction to date.
Auction prices have varied considerably over time and over
markets. This is seen in Figure 1, which presents the per
person price of a 20 MHz license (2 x 10 MHz paired) in
several major spectrum auctions.3 For comparison purposes,
Figure 1 also shows past and current US auctions of 2G
spectrum. The first three US auctions occurred over three
years before the 3G auctions in Europe. The fourth US
auction concluded in January 2001 with a price comparable
to the highest 3G prices. Part of the price variation is
explained by the different times at which the auctions
occurred. Part of the difference in the European prices is
explained by the size of the various countries. Markets like
Auction Winners and Winning Bids
ABCD E
MHz 2 x 15 2 x 15 2 x 10 2 x 10 2 x 10
spectrum
MHz 5 0 5 5 5
Unpaired
Price T/W Vodafone BT 121 Orange
Bidder
Price  Bid 4,385 5,964 4,030 4,004 4,095
(£M)
£M/MHz 292 398 403 400 410
paired
3 Most of the European licenses also included 5 MHz unpaired spectrum. However, these auctions have shown that the bidders place little value on this
unpaired spectrum, so I ignore the unpaired spectrum in the price comparison. In the US C-block auction, bidders received attractive installment payment
















the UK and Germany are thought to have more value, even
on a per person basis, than the Netherlands and Switzerland.
Still there is much variation to explain. The primary
determinant of prices appears to be the level of competition
going into the auction, rather than the subtle differences in
auction design across the various countries. Competition in
the auction is largely endogenous, since it is the result of
partnership negotiations among potential bidders. 
The two most recent 3G auctions have continued the slump
in 3G prices. Both the Belgian auction and the Singapore
auction ended after the submission of the initial bids at the
reserve price. Neither auction had excess demand.
Why were prices so high?
A critical choice impacting revenues was the decision to
auction five licenses. Five licenses guaranteed that a new
entrant would win a license. This certainty that an entrant
would win created a strong incentive for potential entrants,
especially strong potential entrants to enter the bidding. Setting
aside the largest license for a new entrant further intensified the
incentive to enter. Not only would a new entrant win, but the
successful entrant would win the best license.
The experience in the Netherlands illustrates the importance
of having more licenses than incumbents in stimulating
revenues. In the Netherlands, five incumbents bid for five
licenses. The logical outcome was for the five incumbents to
win licenses. Recognizing the difficulty of winning a license,
potential entrants had a strong incentive to partner with an
incumbent bidder. This is exactly what happened. Although
initially there were several strong potential entrants, all
partnered with one of the incumbents before the auction
began. The strongest entrant, Deutsche Telecom, partnered
with the weakest incumbent, Ben; DoCoMo and Hutchison
partnered with KPN; and NTL was already effectively
partnered with Dutchtone (France Telecom has a large
interest in both). This left one weak entrant in the bidding. At
the beginning of the auction, just six bidders were competing
for five licenses: five strong incumbents and one weak
potential entrant (Versatel). It was not long before the lone
entrant gave up.
Two further factors were important in the high revenues
achieved. Both have to do with the timing of the auction. 
First, the UK auction was the first in the sequence of
European 3G auctions. The largest wireless operators
believed that winning a license in the UK was an important
first step in becoming or sustaining a major position in
Europe. The UK was the foot in the door to Europe and
potentially the world. Generally, when bidding in a sequence
of auctions for complementary items, the early items sell for
more, since winning the early items gives the winner a
competitive advantage in winning subsequent
complementary items. Also, since it was the first auction, the
bidders were unable to predict the extremely high prices that
would result if they did not form alliances before the auction. 
Second, the auction occurred at the peak of an apparent
high-tech stock bubble. Wireless and other high-tech
companies were being valued at all-time highs and at
unheard of price-earnings multiples. Certainly for the
incumbents, but also for the strongest new entrants, the
question of value was transformed into a question of how
much the stock price would be hurt if the company failed to
win a license. With UK wireless companies being valued in


























































the tens of billions, paying four billion for entry into the 3G
business seemed reasonable. In this way, the inflated stock
market values had a direct impact on the companies'
willingness to bid.
Finally, the ascending auction format coupled with the large
excess demand likely contributed to high prices. First, the
ascending format gave the bidders greater comfort in bidding
higher, since they were able to see the large number of
competitors that were willing to bid higher. In an ascending
auction, dropping out is an admission of inferiority in some
sense. Bidders ask themselves, "If the license is worth a lot to
my competitor, why is it not worth a lot to me?" By bidding
higher, the company does not concede it is inferior to its
competitors. Second, an ascending auction over seven weeks
gave the bidders ample time to go back to board to ask for
additional money. Initial budget constraints were relaxed.
Choice of allocation
The decision to auction five licenses had a big impact on the
competition objective in addition to its impact on revenues.
Five licenses meant that there would be five 3G service
providers. Moreover, the success of the new entrant was
enhanced by setting aside the best license for the entrant.
Hence, the allocation appears to be highly consistent with
encouraging competition.
There were four other reasonable choices for the allocation:
1 Four licenses, each with 2x15 MHz.
2 Five licenses, two 2x15 and three 2x10, as in the UK,
but without setting aside the best license for an entrant.
3 Six licenses, each with 2x10 MHz.
4 Twelve 2x5 MHz blocks, requiring that each winner win
either two or three blocks.
The four-license option maintains the status quo of four
incumbents. This would be desirable if the industry cannot
support a fifth operator. However, the experience in the US
and parts of Europe appears to suggest that five operators can
operate profitably. The four license approach would likely
result in the least competitive market structure. It also would
likely lead to the lowest auction revenues.
The five-license option (without the best license set aside for
a new entrant) does add another competitor in the wireless
market. Moreover, unlike in the set-aside approach, the
second large license would end up with the second-strongest
incumbent (BT), rather than the entrant. This outcome is more
efficient, since the second-strongest incumbent likely can
make better use of the extra 5 MHz of paired spectrum.
Revenues could be lower with this option, since Vodafone
and BT would no longer have to compete for the only large
license. The price for the large licenses would be set by
Orange. Whether overall revenues would be higher or lower
without the set-aside depends on how high Orange would be
willing to bid for the extra 5 MHz. Based on the observed
bidding, Orange only bid on the large license when the
spread between large and small was less than about
£450 million. This suggests that revenues would probably be
slightly lower without the set-aside. BT forced a spread of
nearly £2,000 million between large and small. If without the
set-aside, Orange forces a split of only £500 million, then
revenues would fall.
The six-license option is desirable if adding a sixth operator
does foster competition. However, one must recognize that
there are significant fixed costs in this industry. It is entirely
possible that the number six entrant in the market is
necessarily too weak to offer much in terms of service
innovation or price competition. The issue is largely an
empirical question that will take time to resolve. The German
and Austrian auctions suggest that at least in the major
markets there is room for six. Given the overwhelming
evidence that greater competition fosters both service
innovation and lower prices, the Government should err on
the side of two many licenses, rather than too few. Adding a
new entrant after the auction by splitting up an incumbent is
almost impossible. Consolidation after the auction is much
easier to implement.
Total auction revenues would likely be slightly lower with six
licenses. There are two reasons. First, Telefonica would
become the marginal bidder. In the five license auction,
Telefonica dropped out at £3,668, compared with NTL's
dropout at £3,971. All six licenses would sell for
approximately Telefonica's dropout point. Second,
Telefonica's dropout point would be less, since it would be
bidding to participate in a six-player market as opposed to a
five-player market. The  difference in revenues, however,
likely would not be large.
The auctioning of 5 MHz blocks, as was done in Germany
and Austria, lets the bidders decide how many winners there
should be. The number of winners would be between four
and six under this approach. This approach would appear to
be highly desirable, since the number of winners is
determined by a competitive process. However, one might
fear that there would be a strong tendency for the four
incumbents to win all the spectrum, each getting three
blocks. Incumbents have substantially higher values because
of their incumbent position, and they benefit from excluding
new entrants. However, it is possible that the incumbents
would recognize that by only bidding on two blocks the
auction would end at much lower prices. The incumbents in
essence make room for two new entrants in order to keep the
prices down. The question is whether the benefit from
reducing demands more than compensates for the reduced
profits in a six-player vs. a four-player market. Given the
outcome in both German and Austria involved six winners,
rather than four or five, it would appear that this design does
not discourage entry too much. Another potential
















allow the bidders to bid on particular bands of spectrum. This
can introduce an inefficiency if different bidders value the
different bands differently.
A variation of the German approach would be to set aside
two blocks for a new entrant and then let the bidding
determine whether there would be four or five winners for the
remaining ten blocks. This would guarantee at least five
winners, and allow a six winner if the sixth bidder is willing
to bid higher than the two strongest incumbents.
Choice of auction format
Based on the objectives of efficiency and competition, the
Government made a wise choice of auction format. 
The simultaneous ascending auction was highly efficient. The
five winning firms demonstrated that they valued the
spectrum more than the eight losing bidders. The only
potential source of inefficiency was setting aside a large
15 MHz license for a new entrant. The bidding revealed that
BT valued the extra 5 MHz more than the new entrant TIW.
However, guaranteeing that the entrant would win a 15 MHz
license and not be forced to pay BT's incremental value for 5
extra MHz likely was pro-competitive, both in the auction
and in the post-auction market. The set-aside surely
stimulated participation by potential entrants. Post-auction
competition was also stimulated, since the new entrant (TIW)
will be stronger and less capacity constrained as a result of
the extra 5 MHz block. On balance, setting aside the largest
license for a new entrant probably was a desirable tradeoff
between competition and efficiency.
Contrast with the US auctions
The differences between the UK auction rules and those in
the US auctions were minor. I list them below:
1 In the US, the current price bidder can raise its own bid.
This was not allowed in the UK auction. Raising one's
own bid typically is a bad strategy. Nonetheless, bidders
in the US frequently have done so, especially early in
the auction to stake out particular regions. I see little
advantage or disadvantage in forbidding this practice of
raising one's own bid. 
2 In the US, as the percentage increment changes, the
minimum bid on a license reflects the new increment
immediately, regardless of whether the license receives
a new bid in the round. In the UK, the minimum bid on
a license would only be adjusted after the license
received a new bid. Typically, reductions in the
percentage increment occur after one or more bidders
drops out of the auction. Since the licenses were all
excellent substitutes it seems appropriate that all
licenses should reflect the reduction in bid increment
immediately, rather than waiting until after a license
receives a bid. Still I do not believe that this difference
had a significant impact on the outcome.
3 In the US, bid raises are a whole number of bid
increments, from one to nine. In the UK, new bids could
be any amount in tenths of a million between the
minimum bid and the maximum bid. This enabled the UK
bidders to make small jump bids. Since even small jumps
are rare near the end of the auction, it is unlikely that this
difference had any impact on the auction outcome.
4 The US does not use a "ratcheting deposit," as was used
in the UK. Having the deposit increase with higher bids
provides extra protection against default, but it does
complicate the bidding mechanics. Non-performance is
a serious concern. Still I believe that typically it is
possible to set an appropriate deposit before the
auction, and avoid the extra complication requiring the
bidders to raise deposits as bids increase. In the
UK auction, the complication was slight, since there
was just a single increase in deposits when bidding
reached £400 million.
5 The US auctions do not have an initial phase to
eliminated associated bidders. Having the initial phase
was probably a good idea in the UK, where bidder
associations are more common than in the US. Although
phase one was not used in the actual auction, it served
as a useful threat point in the negotiations among
associated bidders before the auction began.
6 The US does not allow a bidder to call a recess in the
bidding. The recess feature potentially could add several
days to the bidding. In fact, only one recess was used. This
was by Telefonica when key members of the auction team
were tied up in a major shareholder meeting. It is possible
that recesses could be useful for bidders that need extra
time to make critical decisions. However, in this
particular auction, I believe that recesses were not
important, since it was straightforward for bidders to
estimate where prices were likely to be after another day
or two of bidding and take appropriate actions.
None of the differences between the US auctions and the
UK auction were significant. The outcome would have been
























Contrast with other 3G auctions
Three basic auction formats have been used in the
3G auctions.
1 The UK format. Used in the UK, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, Belgium, and Singapore. Bidders bid on
particular licenses in a simultaneous ascending auction.
2 The Italian format. Used in Italy. Bidders do not bid on
specific bands. Hence, all licenses are identical at the
time of bidding. A simultaneous ascending auction is
used. When no one is willing to bid higher the auction
ends with the four highest bidders receiving a license
and paying their bids. The particular bands won is set at
the end of the auction.
3 The German format. Used in Germany and Austria. Like
in Italy, the bands are determined at the end of the
auction. All blocks are identical at the time of bidding.
Bidders bid for two or three 5 MHz blocks in a
simultaneous ascending auction.
The Italian format only makes sense if the licenses are
identical at the time of bidding. This was not the case in the
UK, since the licenses were of different sizes. Moreover,
bidders typically care about the particular band that they
receive. To the extent that bidders preferences among the
bands differ, then the Italian format introduces an inefficiency
that is not present with the UK format. In most cases, the
differences are small, so that the potential inefficiency is
small. Otherwise, there is little difference between the UK
and Italian formats.
As discussed above, the German format has the benefit of
endogenous determination of license size and market
structure. However, the bidding strategies are more complex
and it is unclear whether the outcome is more or less efficient
than with the UK format. Another important difference
between the UK and German formats is that the German
auction was not fully transparent. Only the current price bids
and bidders were reported after each round, rather than all
the bids. This made it more difficult for the bidders to observe
when other bidders dropped from three blocks to two blocks.
This may have stimulated auction revenues in Germany.
Denmark intends to conduct a sealed bid auction. I believe
such an approach raises a significant possibility of an
inefficient outcome.
Hong Kong is using a simultaneous ascending auction, but
the bids are a combination of royalties and fixed fee.
Royalties are problematic because they distort future business
decisions and they require that the government monitor
3G revenues.
Auction implementation
The implementation of the auction was generally excellent.
My one complaint was the use of encrypted fax for the
communication of bids, rather than using the Internet.
Encrypted fax is a little used technology that is at best
cumbersome. Software for conducting simultaneous ascending
auctions using secure Web technologies is now readily
available. The UK should use such software in future auctions.
Other matters of implementation are discussed below.
Qualification and deposits
The UK wisely kept qualification simple. Complex
qualification makes sense in a beauty contest, but has no
place in an auction. Rather substantial deposits were
sufficient to keep out unqualified bidders. As it turns out, the
initial deposits probably should have been larger. However, it
was impossible to predict how high prices would ultimately
go. The ratcheting deposits corrected this problem to some
extent, but the maximum deposit (£100 million) was less than
2.5% of the final bid amount. Although a larger deposit may
have been desirable, I do not believe that the small deposit
adversely affected the outcome.
Pace of the bidding
The Government controls the pace of the auction through
three main instruments: the minimum opening bids, the bid
increments, and the rounds per day.
Minimum opening bids
In retrospect the Government could have set substantially
higher minimum opening bids. However, given that this was
the first 3G auction in the world, there was little information
to gauge where prices would end up. The fact that the
minimum opening bids were too low had essentially no
adverse consequences. It simply meant that the auction
continued for much longer in both rounds and days.
Low minimum opening bids can definitely be a problem in
auctions where competition is weak. This was not the case in
the UK.
A more serious mistake in setting minimum opening bids is
setting the prices too high. Indeed, perhaps in response to the
3G auction, the UK Government may have set minimum
opening bids too high in its next auction for fixed broadband

















Bid increments began at 5% and ultimately fell to 1.5%.
There was little reason to begin with such a small bid
increment. Given that there were eight extra bidders in the
auction, the auction easily could have begun with an
increment between 10% and 20%. Then the increment could
be dropped to 5% once five or six bidders had dropped out.
Higher bid increments would have meant that the auction
could complete in about 50 to 75 rounds, rather than the 150
that was required. The auction would then have taken three
weeks to conclude, rather than seven weeks.
Higher increments would not have hampered efficiency in
any way. The increments still could have been dropped to the
2% level once the bidding was down to six bidders for the
five licenses. 
The cost of an excessively slow auction were not large. Given
the enormous stakes, one can argue that the bidders needed
time to assess how high to bid. Hence, although the auction
could have been completed more quickly, taking 150 rounds
and seven weeks did not result in any significant loss.
Rounds per day
The auction began with few rounds per day. This was
gradually increased until a steady state of about six rounds
per day was reached. It was difficult to have more rounds per
day given the rather cumbersome bidding method using
encrypted fax. In contrast, much larger and more complex
auctions in the US have been conducted with many more
rounds per day. Eight to twelve rounds per day has been
common in recent US auctions. 
Although the auction could have been conducted much
faster, there was little economic loss from the gradual pace.
The high stakes and great uncertainty about value probably
justified the conservative course taking by the UK
Government.
Impact on 3G roll-out
A major concern with the European 3G auctions is the
enormous debt that has been acquired by the winners. Many
fear that the high debt will adversely impact the timely roll-
out of 3G services. As a result of the high auction prices,
especially in the UK and Germany, companies have seen
their share prices drop. Drops in debt ratings have also
occurred, making it more difficult for companies to fund the
cost of building the 3G infrastructure.
Payment for spectrum in the UK auction, as in all the European
auctions, is structured as a one-time fixed fee. In theory this has
the advantage that the fee, once paid, is treated as a sunk cost.
Hence, its magnitude should not affect subsequent decision
making by the companies. If the firms overpay for the
spectrum, the predominant affect is a drop in share price. What
services are provided and how they are priced should be
independent of the fixed fee paid for spectrum.
In practice, excessive spectrum fees can have a negative
impact on services. The reason is that at least in a short period
of time capital markets cannot absorb an unlimited amount
of debt. When there is excess demand for debt, then the terms
become less attractive for the companies requiring debt.
Companies may slow the pace of buildout in order to limit
the acquisition of debt. This problem may be especially
severe for new entrants that have greater buildout costs and
only the prospect of future revenues. This is unfortunate since
if the new entrants are weak the post-auction market will be
less competitive. Excessively high auction prices can slow the
roll-out of 3G services and reduce competition in the market
for these services. The weaker operators may go bankrupt
leading to a consolidation in the industry and a further
slowing of access to 3G services.
If spectrum prices were excessive in the UK auction, it is
difficult to blame the UK Government. The auction process
was structured in such a way that the prices were largely
determined by the strongest new entrant that failed to win a
license. This bidder was NTL. The fact that incumbents were
in a position where they had to win a license did not impact
prices. Prices were determined by the marginal new entrant.
Even if the UK auctioned six licenses, the price per license
only would have been slightly less, and indeed total revenues
may have increased.
Conclusions
The UK auction was highly successful in achieving the
objectives of efficiency and competition. At the same time it
raised considerable revenues. Even with 20-20 hindsight, it is
difficult to make any suggestions that would have improved
the outcome significantly.
The UK Government took great care in its choice of auction
format. The auction was carefully designed and implemented.
The Government made excellent use of outside experts
throughout the auction process. The Government also made
good use of the wealth of experience in other countries. The
reward for the care taken was a highly successful 
auction process.